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Bystanders in Bosnia and Herzegovina 




Research on the Holocaust introduced the concept of bystander in order to de-
scribe the civilian population passively tolerating atrocities committed against 
the Jewish population, which was actively encouraged by the German na-
tional socialist propaganda. Subsequently, a more general approach to this 
concept has been employed to integrate it in a wider range of armed conflicts. 
This article discusses the applicability of the bystander concept in the con-
text of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s. In our case 
study, the media, in particular in the United States, ascribed the role of the by-
stander to the U.S. government, thus calling for its military action. Based on 
witness accounts, as well as reports from legal records from the Internation-
al Crime Tribunal for Yugoslavia and other sources, the author emphasizes 
key differences in the constellation of the conflict between the Holocaust and 
the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Propaganda by the local media first 
cast individuals in ethnic terms, and then actively mobilized the population to 
take active roles in the conflict. Moreover, systematic traumatization was a 
commonly used means to further polarize the civilian population along ethnic 
lines, eliminating any space for passive observers. Thus, the applicability of 
the concept of bystander on the local population in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is called into question.
Keywords: Bystanders, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Military Intervention, Ethnic 
Mobilization, Security Dilemma
Introduction
Historiography and other disciplines in the social sciences, especially psychology, 
have undergone a process of maturation, through which a better understanding of 
the Holocaust and genocide has been attained. The concept of bystander put an end 
to the dichotomous dimension of history writing about perpetrators versus victims 
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(Marrus 1987). As a result of this conceptual novum, a new perspective on the 
Holocaust and the procedural character of the atrocities against the Jews has been 
developed. 
The category of bystander has been identified and approached on different le-
vels: national, organizational, like Church (Barnett 1999), and individual. Within 
those levels, different definitions of bystander have been given. Thus, in his pio-
neering work on bystanders, Hilberg introduced three subgroups of bystanders in 
a phenomenological descriptive manner, which he defined according to their rela-
tionship to the victims, i. e. helpers, gainers, and onlookers (Hilberg 1992). While 
onlookers are characterized as essentially passive witnesses to mass murder, who 
may or may not support the killings, helpers and gainers take a more active part in 
the process, either through direct intervention, or by taking advantage of oppression 
by taking over vacated flats or other stolen property. Thus, the role of a bystander 
implies different types and scales of (in)action, endowed with different degrees of 
moralization, which has been immanent in the literature so far. 
A more general approach to bystander-behaviour, which tries to extend beyond 
the context of the Holocaust by including bystander behaviour in everyday situa-
tions under peaceful circumstances, has been offered by Bar-On (2001). The author 
distinguishes bystanders according to their situational positions and provides seve-
ral categories, e.g. eyewitnesses, distant listeners, etc. Another aspect of this wider 
categorization represents the bystanders’ exposure to the victimization process, as 
well as the hierarchical nature of social order, which contextualizes bystanders. As 
a result of this more subtle classification, Bar-On introduces several categories fo-
cusing on onlookers, and defining them by their motives:
– opportunist bystander: too involved in his career and despite information 
(s)he might have, career is put in the foreground
– ideologically driven bystander: mostly among intellectuals, who even might 
have become perpetrators
– distant bystander 
– other-hating bystander
– institutional-rational bystander.
The ambiguity and fluidity of the concept of bystander has been shown in re-
cent research conducted on states, which have been officially presented and praised 
as being neutral, but turned out to be – at least economically – involved in on-going 
conflicts, and therefore facilitated the destruction process (Cesarani & Levine 2002, 
p. 4).
Still, most researchers seem to conclude that bystanders played a crucial role in 
the Holocaust and often raise some moral issues pointing to the bystanders’ (in)di-
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rect contribution to the development of the atrocities against the Jews in World War 
II. On the other hand, many authors, often departing from a historical perspective 
and the Holocaust, have tried to reflect on the bystanders’ role in future conflicts by 
emphasizing their potential in preventing or halting group violence (Staub 2000).
An important question that remains unanswered is the extent to which the con-
cept of bystander, which has been discussed mainly in the context of the Holocaust, 
can be applied to other cases of genocide and group violence. Is the concept of by-
stander generally applicable to conflict constellations, and if so, which contextual 
preconditions does it require? 
Although this paper does not intend to provide any conclusive answers, it aims 
at discussing some of these aspects by exploring the example of the Balkan con-
flicts. I have chosen to focus on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, 
and specifically the role of bystanders within that context. The war in Croatia will 
be regarded only marginally.
The first part of the paper presents a short overview of the major atrocities com-
mitted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Next, I will examine different levels at which 
the concept of bystander could be applied. Which states have been considered as 
bystanders? Which organizations have been labelled bystanders? Who writes about 
bystanders in Bosnia and Herzegovina? And finally, can we employ the term by-
stander in this context at all? The answers require a qualitative differentiation of 
(quasi) research, which has been conducted in this field with regards to its prove-
nience and (political) objectives etc. I shall try to present local as well as foreign 
publications on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will introduce personal ac-
counts given in diaries or interviews, which provide insight into everyday life under 
war conditions, and the bystander-like behaviour that is shaped and explained on 
the individual level.
Atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina
From the outset, the nature of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been 
subject to conflicting interpretation. From one perspective, the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina can be viewed as a symptomatic case of civil war, i.e. an internal war 
among groups unable to agree on arrangements for sharing power. Some of the par-
ties involved enjoyed substantial political and military backing from neighbouring 
states. Conversely, the international decision to recognize the independence of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina provided a basis for defining the war as a case of external ag-
gression by both Serbia and Croatia (Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 201).
Nevertheless, the conflict resulted in the first large-scale military conflict in 
Europe since 1945 with numerous massacres, the most widely known one being 
the massacre in Srebrenica in July 1995. Atrocities have been committed against 
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each of the three ethnic groups as such, notably not with the aim to exterminate, but 
rather to expel civilians from certain parts of the country in order to create ethni-
cally purified regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Magnusson 2006, p. 53). As a 
consequence, the war in Bosnia turned into a mosaic of conflicts with various ethni-
cal constellations on a regional level. Depending on the ethnic group that dominated 
in the territory, brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing were initiated, mostly against 
Muslims/Bosniaks, but also against Croats and Serbs. 
The most widely reported atrocities that initially raised concern were the shell-
ings in Sarajevo, in particular the shelling of a breadline in Markale in Sarajevo on 
May 27, 1992, which killed scores of civilians (Bugarel 2004, p. 33). The Sara-
jevans were exposed to continuous attacks, which lasted until the end of the war. Al-
though not reported by the Western media, in the summer of 1993, massacres were 
committed against Sarajevan Serbs, mostly by Muslim/Bosniak paramilitary forces, 
which has also been confirmed by recently discovered mass graves of Serbs.
Regarding the regions outside Sarajevo, most of the massacres that took place 
were shorter in duration and were restricted to certain parts of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. I will cite only a few, and to the extent that they are characteristic of the 
wave of ethnic cleansing. 
Kozarac and the whole eastern Bosnia region serves as an example of the first 
climaxed ethnic cleansing, in which several Muslim/Bosniak villages (in the Pri-
jedor region) were surrounded and shelled, and large numbers of inhabitants mas-
sacred (Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 173). The waves of ethnic cleansing in this re-
gion were mainly carried out by local militia and Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska 
demokratska stranka, SDS) activists, accompanied by Serbian paramilitary forces. 
Most women and children were spared incarceration and death, but were left at the 
mercy of their tormentors. Many women, as will be noted later, became victims of 
rape. Refugees trying to escape the fighting ran the risk of being shelled. Men and 
boys, on the other hand, were either detained or killed outright, either upon cap-
ture or during incarceration. The Prijedor region, for example, is well known for 
Serb-held detention camps, one of them being Keraterm, which held between 1000 
and 1400 prisoners (Magnusson 2006, p. 64). In The Hague Tribunal, the incar-
ceration in Keraterm was extensively analysed and documented in the Sikirica case 
(Magnusson 2006, pp. 63-67). Other regions known for massacres include Northern 
Herzegovina, where the brutal ethnic cleansing of Muslim/Bosniaks was conduct-
ed by Serbian paramilitaries. The Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing established a 
pattern that was followed by other groups and on other occasions, albeit not on the 
same scale.
Thus, Serbs too became victims, especially in the region of Odžak and Posavi-
na, where they were expelled (and many of them slaughtered) by Croatian forces. In 
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May 1992, Serbs were also victims of slaughter in a part of Sarajevo called Pofalići. 
However, those who experienced persecution and torture have later testified and re-
ported to have received help from their Muslim/Bosniak friends and neighbours. 
Croats were also victims of ethnic cleansing in the early stages of the war in the 
region of Bosanski Brod where Serbs took control. 
Nonetheless, Srebrenica is the area most prominently known for ethnic cleans-
ing, notably in connection to the massacre in the summer of 1995. Prior to that 
event, other massacres were carried out by Serbs and Muslims, and although small-
er in scale, these took place in and around Srebrenica. However, they were not con-
sidered worth any attention by the media. 
The most brutally fought conflicts took place in Srebrenica and the wider re-
gion. However, the culmination of the atrocities has been identified with the mas-
sacre which took place towards the end of events in Srebrenica. From July 14th to 
17th, 1995, Bosniak soldiers and civilians, mostly unarmed Muslim men and boys 
seeking to escape Srebrenica, were executed by Serbian soldiers. The total number 
of victims, although not yet ascertained, is, according to the ICTY, estimated to be 
between 7,000 and 8,000 individuals. While the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as 
such, has clearly not been defined as genocide, the case of Srebrenica does consti-
tute a case of genocide according to the ICTY. This definition of a single local case 
within the war has been advocated by Bassiouni, who, in his final report, claimed 
that genocide may have been committed on the local level.1 He argues as fol-
lows: 
The question of genocide is a little more complicated because of the way the con-
vention is drafted in terms of requiring a specific intent in the way it was carried 
out, and as to whether or not the convention is to be interpreted as encompassing 
an entire group. We at the Commission took a more progressive look at it and said 
that genocide should be interpreted not in light of an entire group, as was the inter-
pretation that followed the Holocaust because that was the pattern that was taken 
by the Nazis, but rather to look at it in terms of more specific contexts. So that if 
you took, for example, the context of Prijedor, where 56,000 Bosnians are miss-
ing and a large number of them were killed, particularly the intellectual elite, the 
leadership, et cetera – if you took that context, that is, the Prijedor context, then 
you can find an intent to eliminate in whole or in part a particular group within 
that context.2 
1 About critical reflection on that report and its inventive definition of local genocide see Mag-
nusson 2006, p. 59f.
2 Bassiouni M. Cherif, “Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, 1995 (cited in Magnusson 2006, p. 
74). 
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Regarding total death tolls, several figures have been estimated. The figure of 
250 000 deaths, which has often been quoted by Muslim politicians and intellectu-
als (see e.g. Imamović 1997, p. 11) has proven to be clearly exaggerated. The Nor-
wegian-financed independent Research and Documentation Centre in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, led by Mirsad Tokača,3 investigated the death tolls in the Bosnian War 
and estimated the number of killed to be around 94 000.4 These victims belong to all 
national groups in Bosnia, with more than half, 59%, being soldiers. The total loss is 
estimated to be about 2% of the population (Magnusson 2006, p. 48).
Bystanders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Local Research
The application of the bystander concept in Bosnia is problematic on different 
levels. For one, only scarce examples of research on this issue can be found, with 
local literature on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina having mainly been driven by 
nationalist interpretation, in which the dichotomy victim-versus-perpetrator is over-
simplified, runs along ethnic lines, and disregards any bystanders. 
On the Bosniak side, authors mainly characterize the war as a case of aggres-
sion against an internationally recognized state, which resulted in genocide against 
the Bosniaks. The aggressors are always identified as the nationalist militia from 
Serbia and elements of the Yugoslav army, working in alliance with local Serbs 
(Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 194). Following this premise, Smail Čekić, for example, 
has documented in great detail the preparations by the SDS and the Yugoslav Peo-
ple’s Army (Jugoslavenska narodna armija, JNA) for war in Bosnia, ranging from 
arming the Serbian civilian population to relocating military depots. He concludes 
that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 1990s was the result of Ser-
bian aggression, in which a carefully planned and well-organized genocide was 
committed against the Bosniaks (Čekić 1994). Mustafa Imamović, a professor of 
national history at the Faculty of law in Sarajevo, gave the definition of genocide 
committed by Serbs against Muslims/Bosniaks an even more historical and endur-
ing character, by stating that the extermination of Muslims/Bosniaks by Serbs has 
been going on for centuries, and has been repeated several times. According to this 
account, the war in the 1990s represents the 9th genocide against Bosnian Muslims 
(Imamović 1997, p. 18). Thus, Serbian aggression, coupled with genocide, and not 
a civil war, are the defining themes of the Bosniak narrative.
By contrast, the Serbian interpretation and writing on the war is built on the 
argument that, since Ottoman times, Serbs have been victims of genocide commit-
3 http://www.norveska.ba/ARKIV/Ongoing_Projects/6CFD9857_BDFA_402B_8CF2_
45E9803E08B5/#.Upivkv2x7IU, 20/11, 2012. 
4 These numbers were given by Mirsad Tokača in his last interview for the Bosnian weekly 
magazine Dani nr. 524, June 2007.
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ted by Muslims/Bosniaks. Regarding the war in the 1990s, Serbs were merely pro-
tecting their national rights in order to prevent another genocide against them, and 
Serbia became a victim of NATO and “terrorist attacks” in Kosovo (Drakulić 2003, 
p. 10).
A similar style of narration is found in Croatian nationalist writings, arguing 
that the Croats were the greatest victims of atrocities committed by Serbs, again em-
phasizing that the war in Croatia was a result of Serbian aggression. 
As a consequence, each ethnic group perceives itself as a victim of the war, cre-
ating a strategy of victimization. This ideologically distorted view has to be under-
stood in the framework of the still on-going process of nation- and state-building. 
Moreover, the charge of genocide often implies demands that the alleged perpetra-
tor be punished not only for the alleged acts of genocide, but for all actions sur-
rounding the genocide, where this depiction of events is instrumentalized to obscure 
one’s own atrocities. In addition, as Kecmanović notes, the practice of perceiving 
oneself as a victim provides the group with the moral and material right to reprisal, 
and promises to be the first one to be offered assistance (Kecmanović 2002, p. 54). 
Bosniak politicians and intellectuals especially tend to employ the discourse of vic-
tims of genocide in order, one could argue, to legitimize the creation of a Bosniak 
nation state. 
Consequently, research that still serves nationalist ideologies and nation-state 
aspirations provides little room for the concept of bystander, creating a historio-
graphy that still adheres to already obsolete methods of simply registering events, 
where innovative concepts like bystander seem to be unknown and foreign.
Western Media, Academia, and Justice: 
Bystanders as Messengers, the Policy Makers, and Serbia
Solid and independent research on bystanders in Bosnia and Herzegovina has so 
far not been conducted, and the scarce literature in which bystanders are mentioned 
does often not qualify as research. The first references to bystanders in the Bosnian 
War derive from bystanders themselves, i.e. international journalists who were re-
porting from and about war zones in the country during the 1990s. With the inten-
tion to bring dire news of the War to the outside world, Western journalists entered 
the war zone as direct observers of the events on the ground. Their mere physical 
presence made them, one could argue, take over the role of professional bystand-
ers as messengers, as described by Hilberg (Hilberg 1992, p. 217-224). In their 
bystander-by-assignment-behaviour, the journalists’ main attempt was to deliver in-
formation about the atrocities to the “distant” world, i.e. mainly the Western world. 
Without the ability to halt the violence that was the subject of their reporting, jour-
nalists very quickly pointed to Western governments and accused them of being 
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passive bystanders to the War. However, blaming someone for being a bystander 
automatically implies ascribing a character of genocide to the reported events, since 
the discourse about bystanders is related to genocide. It was exactly this logic that 
determined the style of narrative that was soon adopted.
One of the pioneering journalists who began to inform the U.S. media in this 
manner was Pulitzer Prize winner Roy Gutman. The content of his articles, which 
were published in the American newspapers New York Newsday and the Washing-
ton Post, focused mainly on the events in north-western Bosnia in the spring and 
summer of 1992. Being praised for having discovered the existence of Serb-held 
detention camps, Roy Gutman very soon found a motif, which was to act as a make-
shift for a portrait of genocide, and making himself and the Western world a wit-
ness to this event. Articles, which he published in a compendium called “Witness to 
genocide” (Gutman 1993), were mainly determined by subjectively limited impres-
sions and stories of former Muslim inmates from the Prijedor region, who reported 
about horrifying killings, rapes and torture. Raising the self-representation of survi-
vors to the level of evidence, and giving voice only to one ethnic group of victims, 
soon resulted in an over-simplified picture, in which Serbs were the perpetrators 
carrying out genocide against Muslims/Bosniaks. Moreover, showing images of 
emaciated men, and deportations by train from Bosnia, invoked a clear parallel to 
the Holocaust and Auschwitz. The analogy with Nazi Germany immanently carried 
a clear message to Western policy makers: you have inflicted evil upon yourselves 
by remaining passive bystanders! Your intervention to prevent genocide is needed! 
(Gutman 1993, pp. 42-44).
Thus, by going beyond the role of a mere empathizing outsider, Gutman turned 
into a subjective transmitter of controlled information serving only one side, i.e. the 
Muslims/Bosniaks. In other words, the initial course of defining bystanders very 
soon turned to an instrumentalized tool for disseminating only a certain impression 
of the war, and suppressing others. Moreover, the emotional nature of the Western 
journalists’ attachment to the Muslim cause led some journalists to vigorously dis-
pute interpretations and reports inconsistent with the story line that followed the 
Muslim strategy of victimization (Gutman 1993, p. 38). 
Moreover, in taking advantage of new media possibilities in the age of televi-
sion, filmed interviews appeared again focusing on Muslims/Bosniaks being ex-
pelled from their homes, while Serbs were portrayed as the aggressors. As a result 
of this media climate, a static view of the war was created, with a tight and invari-
able angle of interpretation showing a certain group as the victim, while the others 
were the perpetrators. 
Burg and Shoup have argued that most of the journalists were actually lacking 
the necessary training to understand the events. Therefore, as they correctly empha-
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size, Western media fell largely pray to manipulation mainly of the Bosnian govern-
ment, and became the messengers of a one-sided delineation of the events (Gowing 
1994, p. 42). Thus, the close, yet external bystander role turned into a communica-
tion device that repeatedly accused the UN and Western policy makers of failing to 
end the genocide taking place in Bosnia.
The message of the bystanders-mediators reporting from the war zones was 
thus clear, identifying the Western world, especially Western policy makers, as pas-
sive witnesses of genocide, and the reports alleged that the perpetrators were caught 
in delicto fragrante. 
Interestingly, as Nick Gowing suggests, the United States and the UN, among 
others, knew of the existence of the camps as early as June, and policy makers at 
higher levels were apparently engaged in heated internal debates about how to act 
on this information (Gowing 1994, p. 26). The detention camps were incorporated 
into the reports of humanitarian organizations, and the findings of the Special Rap-
porteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, suggested 
concentration of the Serbian heavy weapons, disarmament of irregulars, and broad-
ening of the UN mandate.5 Those steps, however, were never taken.
The bystander-mediator discourse between international journalists within the 
war zones was an attempt to create the awareness of the West’s passive behaviour 
as bystanders, however, it hardly succeeded in mobilizing the West. Moreover, the 
discourse even failed to generate popular enthusiasm for involvement. In his re-
search about popular perception of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nick Gow-
ing concludes that the U.S. public, although concerned about Bosnia and supportive 
of ending ethnic cleansing and the war, did not support any direct involvement of 
U.S. ground forces (Gowing 1994, p. 38). On the contrary, the public opposed the 
use of air strikes against the Serbs throughout the spring of 1993 (Burg & Shoup 
1999, p. 163). According to the study of the “Mirror Center for the People and 
the Press”, published in November 1993, the American public did not even view 
the War in Bosnia as a matter of high priority for the United States. It was ranked 
well behind “strengthening the domestic economy”, “stopping the flood of illegal 
aliens”, protecting the global environment, and other issues that were regarded as 
more important (cited in Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 163). While the media coverage 
of the developments in Bosnia placed great pressure on Western policy makers to 
act, the popular opinion was not affected. A similar failure of the media to influence 
policy makers has been documented by Gowing. Indeed, his interviews with indi-
viduals responsible for U.S. foreign policy in 1992 underscore the fact that govern-
5 “Human Rights Situation and Reports of the Special Reporters and Representatives: Situation 
of Human Rights on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia”, UN General Assembly and Secu-
rity Council document, A/47/666-S/24809 (November 17, 1992), p. 38.
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ment intelligence sources in fact did provide policy makers with information about 
unseen developments long before the media (Gowing 1994, p. 54). This informa-
tion, however, was deemed to be insufficient to motivate any intervention, despite 
the subsequent efforts of the media. Similar studies about European public opinion 
with regards to the war in Bosnia have not been conducted so far. Thus, analysing 
similarities and differences between the two Western public spheres still remains a 
task of future research.
As the analysis of R. Kuusisto has shown, in contrast to the media coverage, 
which employed the discourse of genocide, the political debate in the West diag-
nosed the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina as irrational, bewildered, and senseless. 
The discursive way of framing and associating the Bosnian war with metaphors of 
nightmares, natural catastrophes, and morasses, created a logical justification for 
a foreign policy by which no involvement was advisable or even possible. In a 
conflict driven by irrational acts, as was often stated, the best behaviour was to be 
a passive bystander, or an onlooker. Any intervention, according to the rationale 
of Bosnian metaphors, would resemble Quixotic behaviour of tilting at windmills, 
shadows and ghosts (Kuusisto 1998). Explaining that “[...] it is inter-ethnic conflict, 
it is massively mixed up [...] It is going to take time. And that is tragic, and it is hor-
rible [...] It is difficult to explain, but this war is irrational. There is no rationality at 
all about ethnic conflict” (Eagleburger, 28 August 1992, cited in Kuusisto 1998, p. 
610). The political discourse repeatedly asserted that delivering humanitarian aid, 
controlling no-fly zones, and offering negotiation opportunities without interven-
tion was a viable plan for a third party to adopt in Bosnia (Kuusisto 1998, p. 611). 
In short, the two main discourses in relation to the bystander role during the 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were presented in non-academic settings, and stood 
in direct conflict to each other. While the media discourse coming from the war 
zones accused the passive bystander behaviour of the Western powers of immoral-
ity, and lack of responsibility towards Muslim civilians being victims of genocide, 
the Western political discourse taking place outside the war zones considered the 
passive standing-by-behaviour as the only option in a war defined by irrationality. 
Both discourses and analysis identified the bystanders outside Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Thus, employing Staub’s classification, both concentrated on external by-
standers, which they identified on the state-level with Western policy makers and 
the U.S. Given the fact that Kuusisto’s analysis focuses on the political discourse 
during 1992, i.e. before U.S. policy intervened militarily, no discussion of bystand-
ers is given in relation to changes in the War’s dynamics.
As far as international scholars are concerned, none have explicitly considered 
the role of bystanders in the context of the Bosnian War as comprehensively as in 
the Holocaust literature. Since many works have been written on the conflict in 
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Bosnia, one has to differentiate qualitatively the research that has been done so far. 
Many U.S. scholars, like Norman Cigar or Beverly Allen, following the same logic 
as the journalists, have been pointing to the U.S. government, especially the Clinton 
administration and Western Europe, as passive bystanders that failed to realize their 
potential to halt an on-going genocide (Allen 1996). Those scholars tend to reduce 
the complexity to a simple dichotomy characterized by Muslim victims and Serbian 
perpetrators. Explanations of bystander behaviour are not given. Furthermore, no 
explanation is intended to be given, since the bystander issue appears in those works 
only as a subject of strong condemnation. 
Many American scholars identify the Western powers, i.e. Western Europe and 
USA, as passive bystanders. Following the premise that bystanders possess the po-
tential to halt genocide, scholars have mainly employed a rhetoric of accusation, 
blaming the Western powers for having allowed the atrocities to happen in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which they in turn identify as genocide as a whole. Therefore, the 
awareness of bystander existence, again, seems to appear only within the discourse 
which qualifies the atrocities in Bosnia as genocide and frames the events with a lin-
guistic practice known from the Holocaust narratives. It follows that the dimension 
of civil war and ethnic cleansing, as well as the Croatian component, are excluded. 
Consequently, the monovocal delineation of Serbs as perpetrators and Muslims/
Bosniaks as victims, marginalizing the Croats, is often reproduced with the same 
writing patterns as local scholarship.
By contrast, European scholars, although not explicitly using bystander con-
cepts, discuss the role of the bystander behaviour of Western powers in a more dif-
ferentiated way, depicting a more gradual development of their involvement in the 
war. Xavier Bougarel, for example, criticizes the oversimplified identification of 
Western powers as passive bystanders. He draws attention to the gradual involve-
ment of the Western powers especially after the summer of 1995, when the dynam-
ics of the War accelerated rapidly (Bugarel 2004, p. 111). Moreover, he makes the 
reader aware of the very broad definition of the ‘international community’, which 
included not only policy makers, but also many non-governmental organizations, 
NATO, the UN, which, in varying degrees, were involved in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na. This, as Bougarel states, determined the rhythm of the War in Bosnia (Bugarel 
2004, p. 39). As he argues, the successive peace plans were shaping the internal 
configuration of the conflict. Massive humanitarian support, for example, the posi-
tioning of UNPROFOR in war zones, as well as the proclamation of no-fly zones, 
definitely provided the population with the ability to survive and take refuge in the 
proclaimed enclaves. Massive air attacks in September 1995, which were provoked 
by the Srebrenica massacre in July of the same year, accelerated the crisis in the 
Republic of Srpska. Additional intervention in the form of economic sanctions ap-
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plied to Serbia and Montenegro, as did a weapons embargo, although often achiev-
ing contrary outcomes, are seen by the author as examples that are inconsistent with 
the previously mentioned accusations. However, Bougarel agrees that more could 
have been done, but explains the ineffectiveness of Western policy mainly by the 
unintended consequences of their negotiations resulting from the gap between the 
perceptions of the conflicting parties and the Western politicians (Bugarel 2004, p. 
42).
Burg and Shoup have adopted a more critical view towards the international 
community, which they mainly define as bystanders who provided outside interven-
tion, but still did not do enough to halt the conflict. Like Bougarel, the authors dif-
ferentiate between governmental (in)action, organizations, peace-keeping troops, 
etc. While they acknowledge an active role by the U.S. government, they criticise 
that the intervention was not backed by any military force (Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 
200). Without necessarily providing an explanation for this passivity, which the au-
thors ascribe mainly to the U.S. government, Burg and Shoup cite some U.S. policy 
makers, who in their statements were illuminating enough. Hutchings’ comment, 
which they quote, points to the essence of the American reasoning:
[Policy makers] never decided whether important U.S. interests were at stake. We 
never decided whether Yugoslavia mattered enough to invest considerable Ameri-
can leadership and, if need be, to place substantial numbers of American men and 
women in harm’s way to halt or at least contain the conflict. (Hutchings 1997, p. 
320) 
That the disputes about intervention were, again, determined by the definition 
of the events, is evident from the fact that those who viewed the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia as a civil war, as did the Secretary of Defense, argued that it did not 
threaten international peace, or require Western intervention. Those who came to 
see the conflict as a case of aggression by Serbia against a sovereign state (Bosnia-
Herzegovina), as did the Secretary of State, eventually pressed for more direct in-
volvement. 
However, a “growing sense” among some of the administration was that George 
W. Bush, who was then president, might suffer “political damage” in the upcoming 
elections if the administration failed to act. By citing those arguments, the authors 
make clear that the motivation to give up a passive onlooker role was provided 
mainly by the self-interest of the U.S. government.
Identifying somebody as a bystander-onlooker implies also declaring the same 
person, government, or state, as being capable of intervening in, or halting an on-
going genocide. Interestingly, the radius of bystanders in the literature has been 
mainly restricted to the Western countries, endowing only them with the possibility 
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to react. The Arab World and the East, as far as I know, have never been put in this 
context. 
With regards to the only local case, Srebrenica, which has been classified by 
the ICTY as genocide, the role of bystander was again assigned to an external group, 
namely the UN. Being declared a “safe area”, UN troops were obliged to effectively 
guarantee “peace and security” of the civilians. A growing literature on this event 
(see e.g. Delpla, Bougarel & Fournel 2012) has repeatedly criticised the behaviour 
of the UN Dutch troops, and especially the Dutch Defence Minister Jorge Voorho-
eve and UN top envoy Yasushi Akashi, who let the Serbs enter Srebrenica, which 
in turn resulted in a tragedy. Thus, as Vetlesen argues, those bystanders, by assign-
ment due to their professional and principled non-involvement, which is otherwise 
viewed as highly meritorious, provided the Serb soldiers with the opportunity to 
commit the massacre (Vetlesen 2000). 
An alternative definition of bystander in the Srebrenica case is given by the 
Bosnian general Sefer Halilović, who has accused the Bosnian government in Sara-
jevo of remaining passive and letting innocent people get killed (Halilović 2005). 
His main explanation as to why the Bosnian government did not react to halt the 
massacre and left Srebrenica in Serbian hands, was the goal to exchange this re-
gion for Serbian parts of Sarajevo (Halilović 2005, p. 257). In 1996, women from 
Srebrenica angrily protested in the streets of Tuzla, condemning Naser Orić, the 
Muslim general in Srebrenica at the time of the massacre, for having failed to pro-
tect them.6 In July 2003, a heated polemic between Halilović, who accused Alija 
Izetbegović for being a passive bystander (although he never used this termino-
logy), and Izetbegović himself, took place in the newspaper “Oslobođenje”.7
To attribute to somebody the failure to prevent genocide makes the accused 
vulnerable in front of the court, since such failure, in legal terms, entails punish-
ment. Regarding the judicial perspective in the Srebrenica case, the Hague Tribunal 
released its definition of the “passive bystander” on February 26, 2007. In its judge-
ment, the ICTY argued that, although not involved in the realisation of genocide, 
Serbia had violated its obligation under the Genocide Convention to prevent geno-
cide in Srebrenica. It states the following: 
In view of their undeniable influence and of the information, voicing serious con-
cern, in their possession, the Yugoslav federal authorities should, in the view of 
the Court, have made the best efforts within their power to try and prevent the 
tragic events then taking shape, whose scale, though it could not have been fore-
seen with certainty, might at least have been surmised. The FRY leadership, and 
6 Oslobođenje, 24-29 August 1996, p. 3.
7 Oslobođenje, 11 July 2003, p. 4.
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President Milošević above all, were fully aware of the climate of deep-seated ha-
tred which reigned between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims in the Srebrenica 
region. Yet the Respondent has not shown that it took any initiative to prevent 
what happened, or any action on its part to avert the atrocities which were commit-
ted. It must therefore be concluded that the organs of the Respondent did nothing 
to prevent the Srebrenica massacres, claiming that they were powerless to do so, 
which hardly tallies with their known influence over the VRS. As indicated above, 
for a State to be held responsible for breaching its obligation of prevention, it does 
not need to be proven that the State concerned definitely had the power to prevent 
the genocide; it is sufficient that it had the means to do so and that it manifestly re-
frained from using them. Such is the case here. In view of the foregoing, the Court 
concludes that the Respondent violated its obligation to prevent the Srebrenica 
genocide in such a manner as to engage its international responsibility.8
Here, the focus is put on the state level, which is emphasized in Article I of the 
Genocide convention that served as a basis for the judgement. Thus, the failure to 
take all the measures to prevent genocide, which are within the state’s power and 
which might have contributed to preventing genocide, is seen as a crime itself, al-
beit not as punishable. 
If we follow the logic of research, which has been undertaken so far and which, 
to a certain extent, has been accusing Western governments and the US, as well as 
the UN and the Bosnian government dominated by Muslims/Bosniaks for failing to 
prevent genocide, then all of them would sooner or later have to be in the dock.
Further research has to be conducted with more revealing documents that 
might give insight into who really was a bystander, and who had the actual ability 
to halt the massacre.
A look at different discourses in the media, academia, and legal documents 
reveals that, in context of the Bosnian conflict, the category “bystander” has been 
mainly discussed in terms of external bystanders as onlookers. In most of the cases 
it was (Western European/U.S.) states and their governments, which were framed 
as bystanders-onlookers. We may conclude that awareness of (external) bystand-
ers has not been articulated on a very sophisticated level. Moreover, as the Western 
media coverage has shown, it often was a product of controlled information em-
ployed for victimization strategies used by the Bosniak side. Explanatory models 
for bystander behaviour among identified instances have been scarce, and mostly 
focus on self-interest. All those factors call for a more detailed examination of ex-
ternal bystander behaviour, where a more ‘situational’ approach with evolving pat-
terns might be employed, rather than a static identification that does not take into 
8 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=1897&code=bhy&p1=3&p2=1&p3=6&case=91&
k=f4, 29/11/2012.
Lučić, I., Bystanders in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Conflict in the 1990s
43
account any specific constellation, or their progressing character. Moreover, given 
the fact that only Srebrenica has been defined as genocide, the question remains as 
to what extent bystander behaviour is applicable in the case of the Bosnian war as a 
whole.
In the next section I will try to explain why it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
apply the concept of internal bystander as onlooker, as has been done in the case of 
the Holocaust. 
Bystanders in the Bosnian Conflict?
As already noted, the bystander issue derives mainly from the scholarly literature 
on the Holocaust. It has been emphasized that the Nazi propaganda’s primary func-
tion was not to incite violence, but to pacify in-group members and accommodate 
them to the new system of exclusion and persecution of Jews (Dulić 2005, p. 32). 
With the creation of a narrative that labelled the Jews “objective enemies” of so-
ciety, and thus endowed them with the role of a scapegoat, society was to be made 
receptive of a reality of collectivist exclusion of the Jews. “Ordinary people”, in-
group members not involved in the perpetration of violence, were expected to per-
petuate their “ordinary” social practices on the quotidian level in their already em-
bodied social roles. The reorganization of the framework of reality, which made the 
extermination of Jews necessary, was to be experienced as norm-given and should 
not disturb the continuity of everyday life. Consequently, the process of destruc-
tion was integrated into a quasi-normal and peaceful everyday life, embodied by 
already habituated social actions, which expected the individual to become a pas-
sive bystander, onlooker, not reacting to the destructive processes going on at the 
same time. 
By contrast, the Bosnian war was an example of armed combat, which raises 
the crucial question about the existence of internal bystanders. It was shaped by 
ethnic mobilization and conflict in which all three ethnic groups of the country 
participated. After the first shot in Sarajevo, and the barricades along the streets, 
the normative framework abruptly changed and was reset into an unexpected con-
text of violence. The public political and social landscape was no longer offering 
the normality, in which anyone could have perpetuated quotidian habits. As Dušan 
Kecmanović, a Serbian psychiatrist and former professor at the Faculty of Medi-
cine in Sarajevo observes, the political landscape of a once peaceful multinational 
and multi-confessional Bosnia and Herzegovina changed into a public space of vio-
lence, where ethnic affiliation and nationalist passions became the crucial deter-
minant of identity formation and perception of others among all three groups, the 
Serbs, Croats and Muslims/Bosniaks (Kecmanović, 2002). As soon as nationalist 
parties introduced the cultural grammar of nationalism, which began to dictate the 
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narratives, the new reality started to provide civilians with new identities, regard-
less of their willingness to accept it or not. Thus, people who once defined them-
selves through their profession or class affiliation were forced to become members 
of the Serb, Croat or Bosniak people, based on their names or religious affiliation. 
In other words, according to the logic of ethnic times, a Serb in Sarajevo, who might 
not have shared anything but his ethnic affiliation with the Serb soldiers who were 
bombing the city, was considered as and equated to the Serb aggressors. This vio-
lent imposition of ethnic identities on people served to involve them in the armed 
conflict and made them enact ethnic roles. Therefore, no continuity of the former 
realities of a multicultural Bosnia was intended to be preserved, but a discontinuity 
was to be established, according to which people should quit with the past. The im-
position of ethnic identity, which one might not even perceive as one’s own, in this 
new context of violence, made it hard to continue a civilian life and remain aside to 
what happened. The only form of accommodation to the newly defined framework 
of norms was the acceptance of ethnic identity, which was especially hard for peo-
ple of mixed ethnic affiliations, or who had a partner who belonged to a different 
ethnic group. These people were left without any alternative but to escape the areas 
affected by the conflict. In fact, they were often the first to do so. How people dealt 
with those new realities will be shown below. 
This abrupt change of reality and situation was not prepared by propaganda, 
neither did it serve to make people continue their old social practices, since those 
were mostly based on inter-ethnic acceptance. The change was rather to mobilize 
people for action in ethnic terms, rather than to pacify them.
Consequently, no space was left for internal members of society to remain pas-
sive witnesses, with a standing-by-behaviour defined as onlookers. After the arrival 
of ethnic times and the change of the political landscape, people were drawn into 
new social frames, where they could not escape their ethnic affiliation as their pri-
mary identity.
The fact that the imposition of nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina came 
abruptly and without previous propaganda highlights the role of the media, which 
will be discussed in the next section.
Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ervin Staub has emphasized the evolutionary aspect of the pacification process dur-
ing the Holocaust. According to his work, psychological possibilities to remain pas-
sive to human sufferings result form a developmental process along the psychologi-
cal continuum of destruction (Staub 1989b, p. 91). Here, ideology and propaganda 
have been identified as the main tools that served the amalgamation of new utopian 
views, and the acceptance of a new hierarchy of social order. This also explains the 
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crucial role of the media as a medium for establishing a parasitic attitude towards 
the atrocities, and without the necessity to feel any responsibility to act. 
As far as the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, there were differ-
ent methods of pacifying the local population. With regards to the media in Bosnia, 
Mark Thompson has analysed the change of their discourse. He alerts to the fact 
that no ideological submissiveness to nationalism was evident or shown prior to the 
War in Bosnia. Thus, no nationalist propaganda was spread through the media, and 
no attempts to pacify were made. In fact, during the transition to a multiparty go-
vernment and the run-down to war, Bosnian media, like the daily “Oslobođenje”, 
or the TVSA (Television Sarajevo), were trying to retain anti-nationalist attitudes 
despite initial attempts by the Serb nationalist party SDS to split the media along na-
tional lines. As Thompson concludes, this was not so much a result of independent-
minded journalists, but a consequence of the government’s inability to subjugate the 
media to its control. Moreover, nationalist sectarianism was increasingly opposed 
by the largest Muslim party, Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske ak-
cije, SDA) since its overriding goal was to preserve the republic (Thompson 1999, 
p. 263). Also, as armed conflict erupted in Kosovo, Slovenia and Croatia, the Bos-
nian way of reporting was characterized by impartiality.
Even after the break-out of violence in Bosnia, the media continued to em-
ploy a vague vocabulary that was more mystifying than revealing of the nature of 
the conflict. The reasons for this interpretation of the events, which were going 
on in Croatia, and later even in Bosnia itself, are manifold. Fear was one of them. 
As the Radio-television Bosnia and Herzegovina (RTVBH) radio journalist, Rade 
Trbojević, a Serb by nationality, stated, proclaiming the JNA attack on Sarajevo 
might have resulted in the realisation of threats that were already posed to jour-
nalists by Serbian nationalist politicians in the form of individual harassment and 
intimidation (Thompson 1999, p. 215). However, this is not enough to explain the 
reasons for the unusual media behaviour. The psychological factor and the belief 
that JNA could never turn against Bosnia, regardless of what it might have done 
in Croatia, and that the outside world would never let a general war happen, was 
widespread in Bosnia, including among journalists (Thompson 1999, p. 230). In 
the same vein, Miloš Vasić from the Serbian weekly “Vreme” wrote that “the pos-
sibility of a war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was so appalling to everyone that it 
bordered on the unthinkable, like a global thermonuclear war, from a Yugoslav 
standpoint” (Vasić, Miloš. Balkan War Report, Jan 1993, cited in Thompson 1999, 
p. 230). A professional factor was also given by the fact that the media were staffed 
with ideological journalists, who were used to working for a totalitarian regime 
that provided a pro-Yugoslav and pro-JNA ideological framework. All those fac-
tors resulted finally in an RTVBH’s effect on its audience, which was precisely the 
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opposite of TV Belgrade and TV Zagreb on theirs, in that it disarmed them psy-
chologically.
As the war progressed, and Bosnia came to be divided into several ethnically 
dominated regions, nationalist media were set up alongside the parallel autonomous 
territories. Journalists who were not willing to subvert to nationalist discourse at 
first were forced to do so. If not, individual harassment or intimidation was to fol-
low. One victim of this new policy was TV journalist Ljubomir Ljubojević, a Serb 
by nationality. After criticizing the (Bosnian) government, he was forced to join the 
Bosnian Army. In his effort to escape from Sarajevo, he was caught by Serb troops, 
who took him to Pale and forced him on Kanal S (a Serbian newly introduced chan-
nel) to “rehabilitate” himself for having served “Muslim television” (Thompson 
1999, p. 216). 
On April 8th, 1992, after the independence of the “republic” was proclaimed 
by its leadership under Karadžić, Srpska Republika BiH Novinska Agencija SRNA 
(Serb Republic News Agency) was established as the news agency of the Serb Re-
public of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its character was very similar to the TV pro-
gramme broadcast in Serbia based on the hallmarks of disinformation and close 
collaboration with Serb media. Their stories, which were often contradictory and 
aggressive, frequently employed manipulative techniques, giving distorted pictures 
of the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Croat equivalent of SRNA and Kanal S were Herceg-bosanska Novin-
ska Agencija, HABENA (the Herceg-Bosna News Agency) and TV Široki Brijeg. 
HABENA was founded on August 28, 1993, after the proclamation of the “Herceg-
Bosna republic”. Following similar patterns as the Serb nationalist media, the re-
ports manipulated the tragedy of Bosnian Croats for Croatian television, ranting 
against mujahedin and Islamic fanatics (Thompson 1999, p. 262). 
Although the media content started to split apart and adopted nationalist views 
that were often forced upon journalists, it is still a matter of research as to what ex-
tent these nationalist media had an influence on the local population. No study has 
been done on the media’s direct impact on peoples’ behaviour during the war. Al-
though Roy Gutman has argued that the local Serbian population in Eastern Bosnia, 
who were running the detention camps, accused the inmates of the same offences 
that the Serb media was broadcasting, it remains a question as to what extent this 
was an internalized attitude (Gutman 1993, p. 123). In order to grasp the impact of 
media propaganda on the population, further studies employing more anthropologi-
cal methods will have to be done. Given the fact that the media breakdown left se-
veral parts of Bosnia isolated without any information supply, the consumption of 
the media was restricted to casual information/propaganda. In addition, most of 
the local population, which had to witness killings of their neighbours, stood by 
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because of threats, rather than being convinced by the propaganda. Therefore, in 
the case of the Bosnian War, it seems very vague to explain standing-by behaviour 
through media influence and propaganda.
The opinion-making elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina served an aim opposed 
to the nationalist discourse, which the new political elite tried to implement. Thus, 
no propaganda previous to the armed conflict was broadcast in order to prepare 
people for war, or even to pacify them. The advent of ethnic times, instead, came 
abruptly without previous social engineering and collectivist exclusion.
The Security Dilemma and Imposed Bystander Behaviour
It has already been stated that passive bystanders as onlookers, as described in the 
Holocaust literature, are difficult to find in an armed conflict where all groups are 
involved as combatants. However, in some reports about the Bosnian war and re-
petitive situations, which are often cited in the secondary literature, a pattern seems 
to exist among the local population, which could be discerned as bystander beha-
viour, albeit crucially different from ideologically driven or freely negotiated pas-
sivity. 
In war reports, it is often emphasized that the local population was not, as a 
rule, eager to be part of the ethnic cleansing. The accelerated nationalisation and 
polarization of Bosnia was initially dismissed by the locals, who often refused to 
accommodate the policy of ethnic cleansing. However, what locals still did was to 
passively witness actions of ethnic cleansing, which were most often committed by 
external military forces (Calic 1996, p. 121-130).
In fact, in order to achieve the passive observer-behaviour among the local 
population, various stratagems were used. Most often in order to establish anti-Bos-
niak/Croatian/Serb attitudes, campaigns were initiated by the organizers of ethnic 
cleansing operations, usually by playing on fear. Information/propaganda alleging 
that members of the other ethnic groups would initiate ethnic cleansing of Bos-
niaks/Croats/Serbs, if the addressed group did not act first, was often spread. This 
mobilization technique, which enforced a situation of a so-called security dilemma9 
was the most powerful and frequent tool to motivate the local population to close 
ranks against its former neighbours and to stay passive bystanders to the proceed-
ing cleansing.
9 The security dilemma has been used as an explanatory model for conflict situations mainly on 
the international state level. Its main assumption is that states, but also individuals, act violently 
towards one another out of uncertainty about the other’s intention. Thus as e.g. individuals can 
find themselves in a situation of kill first (or in this case let be killed) or run the risk of being killed. 
For an illuminating explanation of the security dilemma on the intrastate level, see Roe 1999.
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One example that illustrates the security dilemma is the account of ethnic cleans-
ing committed by Muslims/Bosniaks, as presented by Ejub Štitkovac. He recounts 
how the story of the murder of a farmer’s wife by Muslims/Bosniaks was spread far 
and wide in the area around Bihać, in order to turn the Serbian population against 
the Muslims/Bosniaks. The instigators of ethnic cleansing, however, were most often 
outsiders to the cities and towns about to be cleansed, and often included warriors 
from Serbia (Štitkovac & Udovički 1997, p. 181). Thus, although not driven into the 
destruction process, the local population acted out of imposed anguish and did there-
fore not oppose the killings of innocent people. By spreading misinformation, which 
portrayed other ethnic groups as potential killers, locals were trapped into the logic 
of “kill first, or in this case let being killed, or run the risk of being killed”. 
Another illuminating example is given by the American journalist Peter Maass, 
who interviewed two Serbian women. When asked why the Muslims/Bosniaks in 
Banja Luka were arrested, the women answered:
Because they were planning to take over the city. They had already drawn up 
lists... Thank God they were arrested first. (cited in Vetlesen 2000, p. 527)
Running the risk of being killed did not only mean ‘by other ethnic groups’, but 
very soon included the risk of being killed by the perpetrators of one’s own ethnic 
group. In Bijeljina, for example, a number of local Serbs tried to halt a massacre 
committed by Arkan’s forces, and, according to Bosnian sources, were killed by Ar-
kan’s men (Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 129). 
Thus, often no ideologically prepared parasitism was connected to the bystand-
ers’ behaviour, but instead the fear induced by the uncertainty about the intentions 
of neighbours or paramilitary soldiers were the reasons for the local population to 
remain passive to the atrocities that were committed against neighbours of different 
ethnic affiliation. Staying passive was therefore a form of self-defence.
Another modality of creating bystander roles and imposing them on the local 
population has been reported in the Mazowiecki report in the context of rapes that 
were taking place. Regarding several patterns of ethnic cleansing, the report notes:
Rape has been used as one method to terrorize civilian populations in villages and 
forcing ethnic groups to leave. [...] The Serb paramilitary units would enter a vil-
lage. Several women would be raped in the presence of the others and that word 
spread throughout the village and a climate of fear was created. Several days later, 
Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) officers would arrive at the village offering per-
mission to the non-Serb population to leave the village.10
10 Mazowiecki report, January 1993, see http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/mazow-
iecki.html, 20/11/2012. 
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In a situation like this, the role of a bystander was not the result of a free choice 
motivated by whatever reason (ideological, career, etc.), but rather imposed by the 
perpetrators. The policy of bystander identity imposition appeared in conjunction 
with the effort to displace a targeted ethnic group from the region. The compulsion 
to be a witness of a crime and to stand by did not serve to make people accustomed 
to a continuum of atrocities, but to alarm and mobilize them (Staub 1989b, p. 91). 
In this context of abnormality, without a pluralism of available social roles, people 
were forced into the role of a “close bystander”, becoming proximal witnesses of 
atrocities. Any possibilities to act in a different way than to observe the occurrences 
were excluded. 
As Maja Povrzanović states, in such a context of wartime, politics of identity 
are not based on choice, but in the absence of choice, they are not based on strate-
gies of negotiation, but primarily on strategies of physical survival (Povrzanović 
1997). Actually, those “bystanders” were simultaneously victims who suffered trau-
mas in their role of forced onlookers. 
Thus, in the context of the conflict in Bosnia, the “passive” local population 
was often left without any alternative to act. And even if one risked acting as a res-
cuer, one often ended up becoming a victim as well. Thus, no categories of the so 
far explored bystander context might be applicable to this context of internal by-
stander-behaviour. Perhaps one might think about a category of “coerced/forced 
bystander”, or “imposition of bystander-behaviour”. This, however, remains a task 
of further research. In addition, a more analytical ethnographic work might help 
understanding the dynamics of this situational type of bystander behaviour. By ap-
proaching the issue on an individual level, rather than reporting it only in terms of 
military strategies or patterns, a better psychological insight into this behaviour 
could be provided.
Bystanders Rescuers
How individuals resisted the enforced nationalistic logic of reality and the fact that 
some people did indeed help each other independently of their ethnic and religious 
affiliation has already been documented in several works. Mainly anthropological 
research11 on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as some personal accounts 
by “ordinary people” collected and published by Svjetlana Broz, the granddaughter 
of Josip Broz Tito, have documented the will to help others despite the risk one was 
taking. Most of the published accounts are personal stories told by individuals, either 
11 One of the most illuminating works is Maček’s dissertation about everyday life of Sarajevans 
under siege, who according to the author’s observations did resist nationalism by helping each 
other independent from their ethnic or religious affiliation (Maček 2000).
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in interviews, diaries or autobiographic works. Thus, the available information about 
people who rescued others is not research, but subjective accounts. Due to the fact 
that personal stories and memories are mostly recollections of single situations of 
small-scale help on the individual level, no “evolution of commitment to help along 
a continuum of benevolence” (Staub 1989a, p. 167) can be drawn. 
Depending on the situation, individual rescuers are reported to be found among 
civilians, as well as soldiers. Dušan Kecmanović, for example, on the escape from 
Sarajevo through Croat-held Herceg-Bosna, reports his personal salvation by a 
Croatian soldier. Being Serb in a Croatian-dominated territory in ethnic times meant 
being equated with Chetniks and the enemy, which happened to Kecmanović. After 
interrogation by a Croatian policeman, Kecmanović escaped detention and prob-
ably even death with the help of a former student, who, in an open radio contact, 
heard that a Chetnik had been caught and the name of Kecmanović mentioned, and 
rushed into the headquarters to rescue his former professor (Kecmanović 2002, p. 
28). It is disputable to what extent Kecmanović’s former student was actually a 
“bystander”, since he was also a Croatian soldier wearing a uniform and being in-
volved in the conflict. However, it is clear that having the role of a Croatian soldier 
in ethnic times, in this specific situation, he bestowed greater commitment to the 
role of a rescuer inspired by the fact that it was his former professor. Other stories 
reveal individual soldiers helping civilians who were total strangers to them. Often 
the social background of these people is not mentioned. The personal motivation to 
aid people often remains a mystery. Moreover, due to very personal reports focusing 
only on individual experiences, it remains a question whether these rescuers were 
actually acting exclusively in the reported specific situation, or if this was only one 
example of a series of systematic rescue attempts.
Turning to the civilian rescuers, Svjetlana Broz has published a collection of 
personal, often very touching stories about brave individuals, often civilians op-
posed to nationalism, who aided people even at the expense of their own lives (Broz 
1995). Again, those civilians who rescued others can hardly be labelled bystanders, 
since at the same time they were victims. Stories from Sarajevo under siege espe-
cially illuminate this. One person who has been mentioned in several stories from 
Sarajevo is the taxi driver, Mile Plakalović, a Serb by nationality. Being a taxi-
driver he was well known among Sarajevans for his courage to drive injured peo-
ple of all ethnic groups to the hospital for free. We can assume that Plakalović is an 
example of an individual with high moral standards, as bystanders rescuers in the 
Holocaust have been characterized, whose greatest commitment was to the role of 
a helper in different situations and contexts. 
Anthropological literature, in which everyday life of “ordinary people” during 
the war has been documented, has also called attention to the aid that people were 
Lučić, I., Bystanders in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Conflict in the 1990s
51
giving each other independently of their nationality. It has been mainly presented 
in the context of taking care of neighbours. Anthropologists, therefore, have paid 
great attention to the neighbours and discovered an explanatory model for the help-
ing behaviour in the so-called komšiluk, a Turkish word for neighbourhood (Baškar 
2007). As Bojan Baškar argues, komšiluk derives from the Ottoman legacy, in 
which inter-religious tolerance is distinguished from other Imperial legacies. This 
practice was deeply inscribed, especially in Bosnia, where three religious groups 
were living next to each other for centuries (Baškar 2007, p. 2). This attitude found 
its way into the literature as a specific Bosnian habitus of multi-ethnic tolerance and 
peaceful cohabitation that allowed for the “simultaneity of both shared and separate 
places” (Bringa 1995, p. 18). The perpetuation of this reality of tolerance has been 
noticed by anthropologists in the War, and often served as a motive for people to 
oppose ethnic imperatives and help each other. Speaking in terms of symbolic inter-
actionism, we can argue that in these cases, people felt greater commitment to the 
role of the neighbour than to an ethnically defined role (Stryker 1980). Preserving 
a good neighbourhood, which resulted in helping each other to survive, was also an 
attempt to preserve the multi-ethnic reality known from peaceful times. But, here 
again, the concept of bystander in its original form cannot be implied, since each of 
those people were also victims.
All of those stories are examples concerning people who were within the war 
and could be delineated as internal rescuers, although probably not bystanders as 
used in the Holocaust context. Regarding an external bystander who became in-
volved in helping civilians, examples on organizational as well as individual levels 
appear in some literature, mostly documenting their efforts in collecting food and 
clothes and sending them into the war zones.
On the organizational level, we have already mentioned international humani-
tarian aid. Although these actions cannot be equated with the rescuing actions of 
people within the war, they are definitely a testimony to activities that cannot be 
defined as onlooking behaviour. 
In conclusion, although no research has been done on the rescuing behaviour 
in the war, personal accounts show that there were individuals who extended the 
ethnic limitations by helping and rescuing people. Although they cannot be viewed 
as bystanders, in certain situations, the role of rescuer appeared to become more de-
cisive. This behaviour is mostly reported on the individual level, however, and re-
stricted to single situations, which hinders insight into the more evolutionary aspect 
of this type of behaviour. Regarding motives for rescue, one explanation has entered 
academic discourse, i.e. komšiluk. All this calls for further attention by researchers 
to explore a new explanatory concept, which could explain courageous behaviour 
by individuals in the Bosnian War. 
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